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IMPERIAL GERMANY 



A LECTURE 



BERNARD MOSES 



BERKELEY, CAL. 
188S 



',S> 



IMPERIAL GERMANY 



A LECTURE 



BERNARD MOSES 



BERKELEY, CAL. 

1886 



V\6 6 



4 3. o ID j 









imperial (!3erm an 11.' 



THE events associated with the foundation and 
development of the new German Empire 
constitute the most important episode in the 
history of Europe since the fall of Napoleon. 
They stand as the culmination of a series of 
events beginning- with the Prussian reaction 
against French domination in 1813. To be un- 
derstood, they must be viewed in the light of 
the failure of the arrangement effected by the 
Congress of Vienna, and of the more or less aim- 
less struggles embraced under the general desig- 
nation of the Revolution of 1848. The new 
German Empire arose, out of the i?uins of the 
mediaeval empire which ceased to exist in 1806, 
when Francis II. laid down the imperial crown. 
At the time of its dissolution, the mediaeval em- 
pire was one of the oldest political institutions of 

* Delivered before the Political Science Club of the Univer- 
sity of California, October 20, 188J. 



Europe. Its existence stretched over the thou- 
sand years from Charlemagne, in the beginning 
of the ninth century, to Napoleon, in the begin- 
ning of the nineteenth century. It rested 0:1 
the sublime idea that it was the sole instrument 
for manifesting and executing the will of God 
with reference to the political government of the 
world. This idea constituted the basis of its 
pretension to universal dominion, but, like many 
of the ideas suggested by the distorted Christi- 
anity of the Middle Ages, it was utterly unre- 
alizable. The mediaeval empire was formed un- 
der the influence of religious visionaries, and 
declined with the awakening practical intelli- 
gence of modern times. The central power of 
the Empire gradually vanished before the rising 
power of the constituent States, till at last the 
Emperor retained only an empty nanip and a 
powerless scepter. 

The year which witnessed the final dissolution 
of this ancient institution saw also the establish- 
ment of the Confederation of the Rhine. This 
Confederation had little significance, except 
as a means for facilitating the exercise of French 
influence in the affairs of Germany. It was under 
the protection of Napoleon, who had "the power of 
summoning the Federal Assembly, and of initia- 



ting ail discussions in it, through its prince-pres- 
ident, the Duke of Dalberg." He had also " the 
right of naming the prince-president, and the 
right of commanding the confederation to make 
war or peace." 

With the overthrow of Napoleon, in 1814, the 
Confederation disappeared, and the political 
disintegration of Germany became complete. 
Before 1814, the year marked by the Congress 
of Vienna, the most persistent political tendency 
in the history of Germany was the tendency 
toward disunion and particularism. With this 
year, however, begins an opposite course of pro- 
gress, leading by successive steps to a more 
complete governmental union of the German 
people. The first step in this new direction was 
the formation of the Germanic Confederation, 
comprehending all the German states, under 
the presidency of Austria. The second step 
was the formation cf the North German Union 
in which several of the most important South 
German states, as Austria, Bavaria, Wiirtem- 
berg, and Baden, were not included. The final 
step was the organization of the Empire. This 
event is noteworthy not merely because through 
it was secured the present union of a large part 
of the German people under one supreme gov- 



6 



also because in it t'here was 
adopted a constitutional provision contributing to 
secure the perpetual maintenance of this union. 
The provision referred to is that by which the 
power to veto any proposition for constitutional 
change is placed in the hands of Prussia, whose 
government is strongly blended with the gov- 
ernment of the Empire, whose King is also 
Emperor, and whose interests demand not only 
that the bonds of union between the States be 
maintained, but that the States be brought into 
a closer union and more complete subordination 
to the central government. If we bear in mind 
these facts, that Prussia has seventeen members 
in the Federal Council, appointed by the King, 
that fourteen negative votes in this Council are 
adequate to defeat any proposed constitutional 
amendment, and that Prussia is vitally inter- 
ested in defeating all constitutional changes that 
do not tend to strengthen the central govern- 
ment, we can readily see that, in the establish- 
ment of the Empire, w ? e have not merely the 
fact of German unity achieved, but at the same 
time the strongest possible check laid on the 
spirit of decentralization. Nothing short of a 
revolution or the overthrow of the imperial 



government by a foreign state can stop the slow 
but sure drift of power towards the center. 

But within the central government itself, the 
distribution of power is not such as to insure 
premanency of the present political order among 
the several departments. It is true, generally, 
th.it it is impossible to apportion the power of a 
government among the several departments so 
nicely that they will continue, as it were, in a 
condition of stable equilibrium. One or another 
will inevitably have an advantage of position, 
and thus gradually draw to itself the balance of 
power. In the early English government, the 
possession of the right of initiating financial 
legislation constituted the Commons' advantage 
of position. Through this it has been possible 
for that body to arrogate to itself all that power 
which was formerly held by other departments. 
In the course of political change there is mani- 
fest a strong tendency to unite the initiating, 
adopting, and executing powers in the same 
person or body; and when popular representation 
is admitted and maintained, that body which 
stands in closest sympathy with the electors will 
ultimately acquire the balance of power in the 
government, and hold the position of superior 
independence. 1:1 the imperial government of 



Germany popular representation is admitted, 
but the representative body has only the power to 
accept or reject propositions submitted to it. It 
has no power to initiate measures, and conse- 
quently no power to make its originating will 
felt directly in the affiirj of government. 
Whenever the initiating function is withheld 
from the representative branch of the legislature 
a conflict is inaugurated which will result in the 
representative body becoming either more or 
less. In England, where this condition of affairs 
formerly existed, the representee body has 
gained not only the right of initiating- measures, 
but also an acknowledged supremacy over the 
other departments of government. The Reichs- 
tag, or representative body in the imperial 
legislature, in its control over taxation, has 
essentially the position of advantage through 
which the English Commons achieved independ- 
ence. If the Reichstag fails to make use of its 
advantage, the Emperor, ministry, and federal 
council will extend their authority at itsexpen.se. 
Any organ of the sovereign, in the unrestrained 
exercise of its delegated power, will always tend 
to enlarge the held of its jurisdiction. As long- 
as the majority of the Reichstag is in essential 
accord with the ministry and federal council. 



9 

tii is body in ly be content simply to register its 
affirmative or negative decision on propositions 
submitted to it; but when the majority of the 
members find themselves committed to pro- 
positions which the initiating bodies are re- 
luctant to formulate into 1 iws, the representatives 
will imperatively demand the right of ini- 
tiating bills through which they may give 
direct expression to their views. That the 
views of a large number of the representatives, in 
the near future, will stand in sharp contrast to 
those of the ministry may be clearly seen from 
the fact that every election brings into the 
Reichstag an increased number of members 
whose fundamental political principles are in 
direct conflict with those of the Emperor and 
his ministers. If the balance of power in the 
imperial government drifts into the Reichstag, 
it will fall into the hands of men for the most 
pirt untrained in self-government. For genei- 
ations under military tutelage and class domina- 
tion, the Germans of the Empire have lost much 
of that power of self-determination and self-re- 
straint which are necessary to the conduct of a 
government by representatives of the people. If, 
on the other hand, power drifts more completely 
into the hands of the Emperorand his ministers, 



10 

the imperial government will assume that form 
of absolutism which marked the governments of 
nearly all important European states in the 
seventeenth century, and whose disastrous out- 
come in most cases is a familiar tale of history. 
One or the other of these alternatives will 
inevitably be realized, and in neither direction 
is the outlook specially hopeful. 

Those who judge of the excellences, or defect 
of government from the somewhat exalted 
standpoint of metaphysical speculation, are like- 
ly to award that one the first place which pos- 
sesses the most complete organization and is 
most successful in preserving peace and order 
among its subjects. There is no doubt 
that the maintenance of an efficient police sup- 
ervision over the conduct of its citizens is an im- 
portant function of the state. Judged merely 
with reference to its success in this direction, 
the present German government must be given 
a very high rank. There is very much in this 
phase of its activity to excite admiration. But 
repression is not the only aim of wise political 
administration. It is one of the highest aims of 
government so to order public affairs that the 
individuals who make up the nation shall not 
degenerate. When this end is overlooked in 



11 



attempts to carry out thoroughly a system of 
minute control, the government is not attaining- 
its highest purpose. As the organism which 
thinks and speaks for the multitudes, who recog- 
nize its authority, it is the business of the 
government to make possible such conditions 
as will favor the growth of a strong, temperate, 
self-reliant, and intelligent nation. The repres- 
sive policy of the German Empire, curtailing on 
every side the field uf independent individual 
action, and hedging each citizen about so 
narrowly that he loses much of the feeling of 
personal responsibility, tends to degrade the 
great body of the nation to the position of an 
unthinking rabble. Repression, therefore, breeds 
a condition of society which makes repression 
necessary. It carries with it no hope of a better 
state. Once entered upon, it becomes a necessity, 
and by it the nation is driven into successive 
stages of social irresponsibility, till at last it is 
torn asunder in the conflicts of classes, or ends 
ingloriously in utter stagnation. 

There is something worse in a nation than the 
confusion and uproar of democracy, and that is 
orderly conduct which has been reached at the 
cost of social independence and individual self- 
respect. Venice and Florence, in their careers 



12 



as independent states, illustrate the contrast. 
The officers of the Venetian government, in the 
execution of the repressive policy, were omni- 
present and omniscient. The citizen who stepped 
aside from his narrowly prescribed course of 
conduct was speedily, and often without cere- 
mony, overtaken by the penalty of the violated 
law. As a result, throughout a long period of 
its history, Venice remained remarkably free 
from internal strife and noisy popular disturb- 
ance. Yet, in spite of all the advantages of 
abundant wealth, of internal quiet, and exten- 
sive intercourse with the most cultivated 
nations of the world, Venice did not produce 
men who have made themselves remembered. 
Florence, on the other hand, which for centuries 
was filled with struggles of parties and the up- 
roar of political agitation, occupies a large place 
in the history of European civilization, and 
many of the most exalted spirits of modern 
times received their first and abiding impulses 
from the free life of the republic. It is not, how- 
ever, pertinent to the subject in hand to affirm 
or deny that literature, art, and learning will 
thrive under a governmental policy which may 
be designated as repressive or protective. 
What I wish specially to emphasize is, that 



13 



although such a policy prevails in Germany, it 
can, under no interpretation, be set down as an 
element in the cause of that nation's exalted 
position in the intellectual world. The men 
who have given Germany her scholarly repu- 
tation are not the products of a stagnant society; 
in fact communities or nations that are willing 
or are forced to allow everything to be done for 
them are not likely to produce original or 
creative minds. In refutation of this view the 
reign of Louis XIV. is often cited. A critical 
examination of this portion of French history 
shows, however, that the literary splendor of 
the reign of Louis XIV. "was not the result of 
his efforts, but was the work of that great gen- 
eration which preceded him; and that the intel- 
lect of France, so far from being benefited by 
his munificence, was hampered by his protec- 
tion." The national intellect wis stunted by 
the supervision of the court, and, "as a natural 
consequence, the minds of men, driven from the 
higher departments, took refuge in the lower, 
and concentrated themselves up o those inferior 
subjects where the discovery of truth is not the 
main object, but where beauty of form and ex- 
pression are the things chiefly pursued." The 
influence of the reign of Louis XIV. on the in- 



14 



tellectual life of France was, in the first place, 
"to sacrifice science to art," and, in the second 
place, to cause the decay of art itself. 

But no parallel between Germany and France 
in this regard is possible, for Germany is only 
now entering upon a phase of history through 
which France passed long ago. England, France, 
and Spain passed through brilliant periods of in- 
tellectual activity and literary culture before 
Germany had fully shaken off the slumber of 
the Middle Ages. The Protestant Reformation, 
which turned all intellectual force to theological 
study and discussion; the Thirty* Years' War, 
which destroyed the nation's basis of physical 
support; and the subsequent century of recu- 
peration, tilled with petty jealousies and internal 
wars, furnish adequate reason for the late de- 
velopment of the German people. Their great 
intellectual achievements belong to the century 
since the death of Frederick the Great, a cen- 
tury in which the great body of the people have 
continued a living and originating force. In the 
struggle for independence, in 1813, they played 
a leading furt. When Prussia entered the 
War against Napoleon the same year, the 
people lead and the king followed. The 
political agitations which made the middle 



15 



years of the century memorable, showed 
the people still able of taking a vigorous ini- 
tiative. Pursuing this line of thought, it 
becomes clear that G?rmmy his grown to her 
present degree of intellectual eminence under 
social conditions entirely unlike those which 
have been imposed on the nation by the Empire. 
The past century of German history which 
records the rise of the nation to greatness, 
records also the operations of a spirit of 
popular unrest, and strong national aspirations 
towards an exalted end more or less definitely 
conceived. Whether the influence of the exist- 
ing system, which tends to crowd the common 
people into a uniformity of insignificance, will 
be such as to continue the growth of the past 
hundred years, can be definitely determined 
only by the enquirers of the next century. The 
teaching of the repressive policy, however, as 
seen in history, suggests a probable negative. 
There may be schools of perfect organization 
and equipment, but unless there is independ- 
ence of character in the bulk of the nation, and 
a strong feeling of self-reliance and self-respect, 
it is vain to look for the development or con- 
tinuance of national greatness. There may 
be the most efficient army in the world, but it 



16 



will be no guarantee °* continued prosperity, if 
the expenditure for its maintenance absorbs an 
undue portion of the national income. The 
army of the Empire is no doubt necessary to 
preserve the integrity of the imperial territory, 
but at the same time the burden which it im- 
poses on the nation must be set down among the 
sources of economic weakness. 

Germany at present is in the condition of the 
athlete who has attained the object of his train- 
ing" and is at the height of his vigor. His won- 
derful development, however, is no guarantee of 
a long life and a hearty old age. On the con- 
trary, the records of such lives show an aston- 
ishingly large number of cases suffering early 
death or premature decline. They have paid 
out the reserve and therefore must suspend 
operations. By nature poor in resources, Ger- 
many has undertaken, by checking the influx of 
the world's wealth, to provide for its vast ex- 
penditures and thus put off the day of exhaus- 
tion. It is attempting to become rich by shut- 
ting its doors to the offered abundance of other 
nations. 

Considering the motives which move men to 
wealth-production, it is a self-evident proposi- 
tion that if men are left free to act, they will put 



17 



forth their productive forces i:i the direction of 
thei v greatest productive ability; and no central 
power, however far-seeing in its paternal super- 
vision, can determine this direction in the mil- 
lions of individual cases as well as the individuals 
themselves. It follows, therefore, that where 
the individual members of a nation are left free 
in their industrial and commercial activity, 
there will be the maximum of wealth -produc- 
tion for the nation as a whole. But the German 
government has seen fit to tiirust its interfering- 
hand not only into that which the English peo- 
ple are disposed to regard as the peculiar realm of 
personal liberty, but also into the affairs of in- 
dustry and trade. By its restrictions and im- 
positions, it has lifted certain departments into 
unnatural prominence, and crowded others into 
enforced insignificant e. This policy has had a 
threefold result. In the first place, it has 
brought to the government an increased rev- 
enue, which has enabled it not only to meet its 
current expenses, but also to build numerous 
imposing structures, either for use in practical 
affairs or for commemorating the heroic achieve- 
ments of the army. This architectural display, 
supported by the revenues of the government, 
has betrayed superficial observers into the con- 



18 



viction that the nation itself is growing rich. In 
the second place, this policy of industrial and 
commercial restriction has had the effect of 
bringing- about a more unequal distribution of 
wealth, giving to certain manufacturers in- 
creased gains, without at the same time adding 
materially to the aggregate gains of the nation, 
or increasing proportionately the rewards of la- 
bor. The wealth that has been added to the 
manufacturer's store has been taken from the 
store of the consumer, for while prices have ad- 
vanced, wages have remained comparatively 
stationary. Thus, in the third place, this policy 
has contributed to the difficulties which the bulk 
of the population experience in maintaining a 
decent existence. Prices have been raised by ex- 
cluding other nations from free competition in 
the markets, but the incomes of the masses have 
not risen in a corresponding degree, if they have 
risen at all. In fact Prussian statistics seem to 
indicate that the class whose incomes are less 
than one hundred and twenty-five dollars a year, 
has increased much faster than other classes. 
In 1882, this class constituted more than one 
quarter of the Prussian population, and in the 
preceding five years it had increased by a mil- 
lion and a half. "The statistics of the other Ger- 



19 



man States," writes Geffcken in 1884, "show a sim- 
il i r result; the poor-rates have increased every- 
where in an alarming proportion, and the num- 
ber of vagrants and tramps have become a gen- 
eral plague. Our industrial production suffers 
from chronic plethora, its net produce does not 
correspond to its immense expansion, still less is a 
real amelioration of the situation of the working 
classes to be decerned. The supply of labor gen- 
erally exceeds the demands; consequently wages 
do not rise, and the lower strata of the popula- 
tion can absorb comparatively little of the mass 
of products which are daily thrown upon the 
market, because the scantiness of their earnings 
does not allow them to satisfy correspondingly 
their wants. But in the higher classes also all 
the callings are overcrowded; the increase of 
academical students has been abnormal and far 
exceeding the demand, and a considerable part 
of this surplus of trained forces, finding no em- 
ployment, perishes or launches into adventures. 
In short, everywhere we find an enhanced strug- 
gle for existence, which engenders dissatisfac- 
tion and hopelessness, and furnishes social de- 
mocracy with fresh recruits." 

The influence of the German government, with 
reference to this last suggestion by Br. Geffcken, 



20 



merits thoughtful consideration; I mean the in* 
fluence of the imperial policy on the socialistic 
agitation of the present. Reduced to its lowest 
terms, the doctrine of modern Socialism is an 
affirmation on the much-debated question as to 
the proper sphere of governmental action. "It 
is not only a theory of the state's action, but a, 
theory of the state's action founded on a theory 
of the laborer's right." It is the extreme oppo- 
site to that theory which maintains the "abso-i 
lute abstention on the part of the state in all that 
concerns material well-being." Such a theory of 
state action as that embodied in Socialism is not 
in keeping with the democratic spirit; it is rather 
to be considered as a logical outgrowth of a mon- 
archy which extends its paternal protection and 
control over many details which in a republic are 
left to the discreet management of individuals. 
It is natural, therefore, to expect the development 
of the socialistic doctrine in Germany, where 
power is exercised under a liberal conception of 
the sphere of state authority, rather than in a 
republic where the people are jealous of state 
power, even when it is delegated by themselves, 
The practice of the German government, in en- 
tering extensively into the affairs of business, 
has tended to deepen the conviction that it might, 



21 



with advantage to the laborers, go to still greater 
lengths in the ownership of the agents of pro- 
duction. In maintaining the army, moreover, 
conditions are established favorable to the in- 
crease of Socialism. Large numbers of men are 
called from those occupations in which they 
must rely on their individual efforts for support, 
to spend a series of years under conditions where 
the burden of support is shifted to the govern- 
ment. Going back from the army to a society 
in which the struggle for life is severe, they 
carry with them the knowledge of what the state 
may do to relieve them of the labor and anxieties 
of this struggle. Having seen that the state can 
successfully manage great productive enter- 
prises, and also that it may support under its 
immediate charge large bodies of its citizens, 
they are, at this stage, ripe for the reception of 
the socialistic gospel. The very process, through 
which a large number of minds have been fitted 
to receive a new social dispensation, has also pre- 
pared some of the bolder spirits to become heralds 
of the glad tidings. From these and other con- 
siderations more or less dependent on the action 
and organization of the society, we are able to 
see how the German nation has become the 
mother of the present discontent, and the Em~ 



22 



pire the breeding place of agitators whose fanati- 
cism is only equalled by their social short-sight- 
edness. They become a menace to social order, 
not because their views prove false the accepted 
basis of society, but because they appeal to those 
elements of the community whose actions are 
not a matter of reason but of sympathy. They 
are the product of a rigid and repressive admin- 
istration, yet the end of their agitation is a sys- 
tem which, to be successful, must be a thousand 
times more rigid and far-reaching in its tyranny 
than any government which they oppose. Their 
opposition is thorough, but not necessarily en- 
lightened or consistent. In their missionary 
tours, they do not stop to understand either the 
faults or the excellences of different govern- 
ments, but are ready, without examining them, 
to lay destructive hands on all. 

When republican doctrines were being car- 
ried out in France, in 1789, the adherents of 
monarchy in Europe thought themselves justi- 
fied in combining to prevent their spread to 
other countries. Had the efforts of the several 
monarchical states been confined to upholding 
their own institutions against the assaults of im- 
migrants from republican France, just men 
everywhere would have been in sympathy with 



23 



their undertaking. But in attempting to crush 
republicanism in France, they went beyond their 
proper sphere. The citizens of the republic of 
the United States have no desire to seek to 
modify the social and political institutions of the 
German Empire, or to interfere with their pro- 
duction of socialists or anarchists; they desire 
only that the foul brood may be retained and fed 
in the original nest. While the repressive and 
protective governmental policy of Germany, 
which limits in a large measure the personal 
independence of the subject, is the fundamental 
cause of this social revolt, it has a secondary 
cause in the hard economic conditions to which 
the masses are doomed. Yet these hard econ- 
omicjjonditions are the very foundation of ex- 
cellence in certain departments. In the United 
States it is difficult to persuade men of high 
attainments to devote their lives to primary 
teaching for the low salary at which women, not 
of high attainments, may be induced to undertake 
the work. The opportunities for individual en- 
terprise, with sure and abundant material re- 
ward, call men to other pursuits. But in Ger- 
many men of high attainments are willing for 
an assured pittance to demote their lives to in- 
struction in the lower schools, recognizing the 



24 



fact that if they abandon their positions they will 
be thrown into a severe struggle for existence 
without certainty of satisfactory reward. Thus 
the poverty of German resources keeps men in 
these lower but vastly important positions. The 
superiority of German schools, therefore, over 
those of the United States, is in large part clue to 
the inferiority of Germany's opportunities for ad- 
vancing material well-being. It is not because 
the German loves money less than the Ameri- 
can, but simply because his opportunities for 
getting it are worse. 

Thus far I have spoken only of the internal 
forces and tendencies of the Empire. What the 
operation of these forces will be in the future 
will dapend somewhat upon the position which 
the Empire maintains in the group of Western 
nations. The external relations of the Germans 
hive been vague and indefinite because the peo- 
ple have lacked national unity. We are able to 
p >int out, however, in the course of German 
history various periods when the foreign rela- 
tions of the nation have been of marked influence 
in determining its internal development. In 
the first stages of German imperialism, the con- 
nection between Germany and Italy was most 
important. It was the connection of a nation 



25 



having traditions of cultivation, with a nation 
whose traditions smacked of the forests and bar- 
barism. The German soldiers followed the Em- 
perors over the Alps, and many never returned, 
but there came back from Italy germs of a higher 
culture. Still the men who had acquired in Italy 
somewhat of cultivation, and tasted the refine- 
ments of an old civilization, remained always 
under the fatal attraction which allured them to 
the shores of the Mediterranean. When the 
bond was severed which had bound Germany 
and Italy into one great Empire, the several 
states of Germany were pretending to independ- 
ence, and the relations between them were as- 
suming the form of international relations. 
When the people were finally divided by their 
ecclesiastical quarrels, the way was prepared for 
a great national humiliation. The utter mate- 
rial desolation which appeared in the track of 
the Thirty-Years' War was not a greater nation- 
al calamity than that loss of independence which 
is manifest when we beholithe Protestant states 
knocking at the doors of foreign princes, and 
asking for aid and protection, and the emperor 
submitting to conditions which practically de- 
prived him of the imperial dignity, in order to 
secure tha services of such an adventurer as 



26 

\ 
Wallenstein. But even a greater depth was 

reached in the eighteenth century, when every 
petty prince of Germany constructed the cere- 
mony of his court and the administration of his 
principality after the model of the court and 
administration of Louis XIV. French influence 
was so thoroughly dominant that it paralyzed 
all manifestations of the German spirit, and ren- 
dered futile all attempts to further the national 
development. Even so conspicious a leader of 
the Germans as Frederick the Great exerted 
whatever influence he possessed in favor of ex- 
tending in Germany the culture of France. 

The complete national demoralization of Ger- 
many at the close of the last century, the loss of 
national conciousness, and the almost entire ab- 
sence of lofty patriotism, made it comparatively 
easy for the conquered German States to submit 
to the conditions of the Napoleonic rule. With 
soma other nations this would have meant a far 
greater sacrifice. Had the English, for example, 
been obliged to submit to similar conditions, it 
would have cost them the painful renunciation 
of that which had grown to be a vital part of 
their moral being. But the moral being of the 
German at that time was incomplete; it lacked 
the essential element of love of country. It was 



^7 



only when the patriotic trumpet blasts of Ivor* 
ner and of Arndt swept over the land, and 
roused a responsive echo in the hearts of the 
people, that the lacking element was supplied. 
The history of Germany's relation to foreign 
powers previous to this time i.^ an unenviable 
record. But at this point begins a period of 
great national achievements in foreign affairs, 
through the important crises of which the na- 
tion has been carried by the well-directed force 
of patriotic enthusiasm. While the struggle 
was for independence, as in 1813, or for bringing 
about a more perfect national union, as in 1836 
and in 1870, it was comparatively easy to keep 
alive the patriotic fire; and in so far as the reign 
of William has created a tradition of heroic 
achievements in which the members of all states 
are proud to claim participation, there has been 
added a stimulus to the maintenance of the 
newly awakened consciousness. But the press* 
ure of poverty, which is being felt by a larger 
and larger part of the population, tends in time 
of peace to crush out patriotic sentiment and 
breed discontent. Yet no way appears open to 
the Empire for an offensive war of conquest 
through which to quiet discontent and arouse 
once more popular enthusiasm; and the defen- 



28 



sive War which must be undertaken against 
Russia sooner or later cannot be said to offer a 
flattering" prospect either to the government or 
to the people. Although, therefore, the Ger- 
mans have known how to make use of external 
pressure from various sides to weld the bonds of 
national union, and to create a powerful senti- 
ment in favor of the Empire, the way does not 
appear open to an equally advantageous use of 
those relations in the future. There seemstobe 
no scope for the future activity of the Empire 
in international affairs but to stand in a position 
of resistance. It has extended its territory to a 
point which reason and the traditions of the na- 
tion suggest as a proper limit. It has closed a 
successful movement towards union with a ser- 
ies of brilliant victories, and it may now abstain 
from pursuing an aggressive policy with entire 
self-respect; in fact, there is no direction in 
which such a policy can be pursued with advan- 
tage and a show of justice. But with the na- 
tions which stand as rivals of the Empire, France 
and Russia, the case is quite different. They 
are predetermined to aggression: France, by rea- 
son of her wounded pride, her great losses of 
territory and wealth and her desire to regain the 
position so long held as the leader of European 



29 



civilization; Russia, through the force of a tenders 
cy as old as the monarchy, and which for a thou- 
sand years has been making itself manifest in 
pushing out the borders of the Empire in all di- 
rections. Between these two powers, the Ger- 
man Empire, in the immediate future, is doomed 
to the ungrateful task of maintaining a powerful 
army of defense. In the case of a nation like 
France, whose parts have had no independent 
existence for centuries, external pressure tends 
to unite all parties and factions in the vigorous 
pursuit of a common end, in other words, to 
bring about a more complete national consolida- 
tion. But in the case of Germany, where the 
several States retain a happy memory of inde- 
pendence, external pressure will not necessarily 
bring about a more complete union and consoli- 
dation. If it is strong enough to threaten to 
overwhelm the Empire, it will the rather have 
a tendency to loosen the bonds of union between 
the States and lead them to seek safety in for- 
eign alliances, thereby destroying the integrity 
of the imperial state. Therefor^, although the 
constitution has provided the strongest political 
barrier possible against the disintegration of the 
Empire, such disintegration may become one of 
the unavoidable consequences of an aggressive 



30 



policy on the part of France or Russia. That 
such is to be the policy of these two nations does 
not admit of doubt. France which all the world 
is disposed to leave in peace within her borders, 
does not wish peace. Her annual army expenses 
are now even more than those of the German 
Empire; and it is not to be supposed that the 
French nation is building up a great military es- 
tablishment simply that it may later go to pieces 
through idleness and corruption. By this vast 
expenditure, France is preparing means which, 
in the impending European war, may enable 
her to have revenge on her ancient enemy and 
set up once more her former prestige. 

The initiative, however, in Germany's embar- 
rassments from without is not likely to be taken 
by France, but by Russia. Two hundred and fifty 
years ago tha western limit of this colossal 
empire was a line running through a point east 
of the site of St. Petersburg. The political 
center of the Czar's dominions has thus been 
transferred to a region which in the seventeenth 
century was a part of the Swedish territory. 
In this gradual and apparently irresistible move- 
ment westward, many states and provinces have 
been absorbed, till at last a halt has been made 
on the borders of the German Empire. Whether 



this halt will be permanent or merely temporary 
will depend upon the ability of Germany to :et 
up a wall of defense firm enough to resist the 
glacier-like movement of the Rrssian power. 
For an indisputable solution of this doubt history 
affords only one method, that of actual conflict; 
and in the conflict, or series of conflicts, which 
is to determine the relative position of two 
nations, the ultimate supremacy will incline to 
that nation which has the more abundant 
resources, either realized or undeveloped, of 
men and wealth. In this respect Russia and the 
United States are the two leading nations of 
the world. They are nations not yet in the 
prime of life, whose period of maximum wealth 
and power relatively to other nations is in the 
future; while some of the other Western states, 
as Spain and, perhaps, England, have passed 
their prime, and in the future of civilization 
will grow relatively less. Russia, therefore, 
appears to be destined to fill a larger place than 
hitherto in the community of nations, and it is 
not improbable that earlier or later some of its 
territorial expansion will be gained at the ex- 
pense of the German Empire. But for a deter- 
mination of the extent to which the Napoleonic 
prophecy will be fulfilled we look to the future. 



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